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From the time of Aristotle, controversy surrounding 
the third man argument has been vast indeed. Each 
generation has its own group of philosophers/scholars 
who attempt anew to determine whether the argument is 
valid, and how its validity may have affected Plato's 
attitude toward the forms. Those concerned with the 
argument as presented in the Parmenides usually defend 
one of two particularly long-lived positions: (1) that 
the argument is invalid, or (2) that Plato's recognition 
of the validity of the third man argument led to his 
dismissal of the theory of forms.1 I hope to demonstrate 
that neither of these solutions to the problem of the 
relationship of the third man argument to Plato's 
philosophy as a whole can prove satisfactory. Further, 
I shall show that the validity of the argument does not 
imply Plato's rejection of the theory of forms; Plato 
certainly does continue to hold such a theory. But 
first let us get before us the argument itself which I 
have divided into its three parts: 
"I fancy your reason for believing that 
each idea is one is something like this: when 
there is a number of things which seem to you 
to be great, you may think, as you look at 
them all, that there is one and the same idea 
in them, and hence you think the great is one." 
"That is true," he said. 
"Hut if with your mind's eye you regard 
the absolute great and these many great things 
in the same way, will not another great appear* 
beyond, by which all these must appear to be 
great?" 
"So it seems." 
"That is, another idea of greatness will 
aonear, in addition to absolute greatness and 
the objects which partake of it; and another 
again in addition to these, by reason of which 
they are all great; and each of your ideas will 
no longer be one, but their number will be in-
finite." 
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"But, Parmenides," said Socrates, "each of 
these ideas may be only a thought, which can 
exist only in our minds; then each might be one, 
without being exposed to the consequences you 
have just mentioned." 
"But," he said, "is each thought one, but 
a thought of nothing?" 
"That is impossible," he replied. 
"But of something?" 
"Yes." 
"Of something that is, or that is not?" 
"Of something that is." 
"A thought of some single element which 
that thought thinks of as appertaining to all 
and as being one idea?" 
"Yes." 
"Then will not this single element, which 
is thought of as one and as always the same in 
all, be an idea?" 
"That, again, seems inevitable." 
"Well then," said Parmenides, "does not the 
necessity which compels you to say that all other 
things partake of ideas, oblige you also to 
believe either that everything is made of 
thoughts, and all things think, or that, being 
thoughts, they are without thought?" 
"That is quite unreasonable, too," he said, 
"but Parmenides, I think the most likely view 
is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, 
and the other things resemble them and are 
imitations of them; their participation in 
ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing 
else." 
"Then if anything," he said, "resembles 
the idea, can that idea avoid being like the 
thing which resembles it, in so far as the 
thing has been made to resemble it; or is there 
any possibility that the like be unlike its like?" 
8 
"Ho, there is none." 
"And must not necessarily the like partake 
of the same idea as its like?" 
"It must." 
"That by participation in which like things 
are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it 
not?" 
"Certainly." 
"Then it is impossible that anything be like 
the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they 
are alike, some further idea, in addition to the 
first, will always appear, and if that is like 
anything, still another, and a new idea will 
always be arising, if the idea is like that 
which partakes of it." 
"Very true." 
"Then it is not by likeness that other things 
partake of ideas; we must seek some other method 
of participation. "2 
(Parmenides 132a-33a) 
I. The third man argument: valid or invalid? The most 
famous journal debate over the logical status of the 
third man argument began with Vlastos3 and has not yet 
fully abated. A discussion of the major points on both 
sides of the dispute may help to make clear the kinds 
of assumptions which must be made on each side, whether 
one holds the third man argument to be valid or invalid. 
Vlastos calls the third man argument "the record of 
honest perplexity," claiming that Plato did not have the 
skill at logic1' to recognize the invalidity of the argu-
ment, but could not prove it to be valid either. 
Vlastos outlines the argument thusly: 
(Al) If a number of things, a, b, c, are all F, there 
must be a single Form, F-ness, in virtue of which 
we apprehend a, b, c, as all F. 
(A2) If a, b, c, and F-ness are all F, there must be 
another Form, F^-ness, in virtue of which we 
apprehend, a, b, c, and F-ness as all F. 
He then works out what he believes to be two hidden 
assumptions, the Self-Predication Assumption, and the 
Nonidentity Assumption: 
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(A3) Any Form can be predicated of itself. Largeness is 
itself large. F-ness is itself F. 
(AM) If anything has a certain character, it cannot be 
identical with the Form in virtue of which we 
apprehend that character. If x is F, x cannot 
be identical with F-ness. 
But Vlastos goes on to prove that (A3) and (A't) are in-
consistent. Since each is necessary and they are 
together sufficient for deriving (A2) from (Al), the 
third man argument is invalid. 
Sellars,5 certain that Plato was convinced by the 
third man argument, reformulates the argument as a 
lengthy proof so that it is consistent, but stops short 
of claiming that Plato was aware of all the steps 
necessary to make the argument consistent: Premises: 
(G) = If a number of entities are all F, there must be 
an F-ness by virtue of which they are all F; (SP) = All 
F-nessess are F; (NI) = If x is F, then x is not identi-
cal with the "F-ness by virtue of which it is F; (P) = 
a, b, c, etc., particulars, are F. 
(G) (1) = If a, b, c, etc., are F, there is 
an F-ness by virtue of which they 
are F. 
(1), (P) (2) There is an F-ness by virtue of which 
a, b, c, etc. , are F. 
(3) Call this F-ness, "F-ness^" 
(2), (3), (SP) <4) F-ness-L is F. 
(4), (P) (5) a, b, c, etc., and F-ness-^ are all F. 
(G) (6) = If a, b, c, etc., and F-nessj are 
all F, then there is an F-ness by 
virtue of which they are all F. 
(7) There is an F-ness by virtue of which 
a, b, c, etc., and F-ness^ are all F. 
(8) Call this F-ness, "F-ness2." 
(HI) (9) If F-ness^ is F, then F-ness^^ is not 
identical with F-ness by virtue of 
which it is F. 
(4), (8), (9) (10) F-nessj^ is not identical with F-ness2. 
(G) (11) = If a, b, c, etc., and T-ness^ and 
F-ness2 are all F, then there is an 
F-ness by virtue of which they are all 
F. 
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(SP) (12) F-ness2 is F. 
(12), (5) (13) a, b, c, etc., and F-ness^ and 
F-ness2 are all F. 
. . . ad libitum. 
Vlastos, needless to say, is unconvinced by Sellars. 
Geach6 is next to enter the debate; he is primarily 
in agreement with Vlastos (that Plato was perplexed by 
the argument), but is certain that Plato would have 
realized the inconsistency that Vlastos has pointed out. 
Therefore Geach looks for a more subtle inconsistency. 
He examines Plato's use of abstract nouns as a means to 
discovering the implicit assumptions of the third man 
argument which Plato would not have recognized: 
(1) There is a set consisting just of the many Fs that 
are not Forms. 
(2) I f x i s a Form by which y is made to be an F, then 
y is not a Form by which x is made to be an F. 
(3) If A is a set of several Fs, and x is an F not 
belonging to A, then there is a set of Fs contain-
ing just the members of A together with x. 
0»a) Some F is a Form by which all other Fs are made to 
be Fs. 
(Ub) Any set consisting of several Fs are all of them 
made to be Fs by a Form that is itself an F. 
The original debate ends with Vlastos' final rebuttal to 
Geach; but the controversy itself continues to resemble 
Plato's early (Socratic) dialogues in being inconclusive 
n 
Strang, following Vlastos, imagines that Plato's 
thought goes through various changes which admit various 
doctrines. Unlike Vlastos, however, Strang constructs 
what he believes to be a consistent rendering of the 
third man argument (the numbers refer to clauses in the 
first section of the third man argument): 
1. Let there be several (a set of) A's; call them Set 
OM Given a set of A's, they participate in one and the 
same F(A). 
2. By OM, the A's of Set 1 participate in one and the 
same F(A); call it F 1(A). 
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3. There is one and only one F(A). (The Uniqueness 
Thesis, U for short). 
SP F 1(A) is an A. 
NI F 1(A) is not a member of Set 1. 
U. By SP and NI, the A's of Set 1 together with F^( A) 
form a new set of A's; call it Set 2. 
5. By OM, the A's of Set 2 participate in one and the 
same F(A); call it F 2(A). 
SP F 2(A) is an A. 
NI F 2(A) is not a member of Set 2. 
6. By NI, F 2(A) is another F(A) [i.e., it is not 
identical with F^(A)]. 
7. Moves 4-6 may be repeated again, and indeed 
indefinitely. 
8. Therefore there are an infinite number of F(A)'s. 
9. Therefore not-U. 
What is interesting is that Strang is not only willing 
to allow that the third man argument rests on both the 
Self-Predication Assumption and the Non-Identity Assump-
tion, but claims that Plato also recognized these pre-
suppositions. Strang blames Vlastos for formulating 
the Non-Identity Assumption in such a way that it would 
appear inconsistent with the Self-Predication Assump-
tion. As a result of his analysis, Strang asserts 
that Plato consigns to the grave—not the third man— 
but the theory of forms. 
Teloh and Louzecky,^ more recent contributors to 
the debate, also find the third man argument to be 
consistent; their evidence is primarily textual. 
Vlastos, according to these authors, is guilty of 
reading peculiar translations from the Greek text.^ 
Their examples are abundant; and I believe their case 
to be compelling. A major presupposition of the 
position of Teloh and Louzecky (which deviates fi^ om the 
tradition of the third man argument) is, however, that 
the second step of the argument is not derived from the 
first. Again, their evidence for so construing the 
argument is textual. In their view, the steps of the 
argument are properly interpreted as parallel. There 
is no "logical gap" between the first step and the 
second because, although it is appropriate to apply the 
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same reasoning at each step, "this reasoning is employed 
about different sets." They further posit a general 
statement which they believe capable of generating all 
the steps of the argument: 
(T) If a number of things are F, there is a single 
Form in virtue of which we apprehend these 
things as F, and these things (either individ-
ually or in any combination) are not identical 
with this Form. 
I am convinced that some rendering of the third 
man argument as valid—with both Strang and Teloh/ 
Louzecky providing likely accounts—is necessary. A 
pressing problem for those who believe that Plato held 
the third man argument to be invalid is to account for 
the fact that plato nowhere in his writings takes on 
the third man and defeats him. If Aristotle is to be 
trusted, Plato did not do so in his Academic lectures 
either. The evidence, in fact, points to the contrary: 
compare Sophist 217c where Socrates (in conversation 
with the Eleatic Stranger) gives credit to Parmenides 
for having made magnificent arguments to Socrates one 
day when Socrates was young. Raven-*-** strikes a middle 
position. He describes the purpose of the third man 
argument of the Parmenides as to affect a dialectical 
movement. Although he goes on to posit (wrongly, I 
believe) that the argument is invalid, his major point 
is still an excellent one. Raven accuses Parmenides 
of making a materialistic interpretation of the forms. 
In the first moment of the dialectic, "greatness" is 
just another large thing (the view which Aristotle 
later presents). The second moment, wherin the forms 
are represented as thoughts, allows Plato to dispose 
critically of a possible misinterpretation of the theory 
of forms. Finally, the thesis that the forms are 
"patterns" serves as a dialectical conclusion. After 
all, is this view of the forms-as-patterns not similar 
to that presented in the Timaeus? Unfortunately, as 
Parmenides points out, the third man certainly does 
emerge to strike at the third moment. Raven claims 
here that an "obvious" fallacy is committed: the thing 
does not just resemble the pattern; it is derived from 
the pattern. Yet he takes the passage to be a success-
ful criticism of the theory of forms as presented in 
the Phaedo, unsuccessful against the more elaborated 
theory of the Republic. 
II. Plato1s judgment: valid. But did Plato himself 
hold that the third man argument was valid? A chief 
argument that he did not is reiterated by Raven, 
11. . . whatever objective validity any of Parmenides1 
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criticisms may possess, Plato himself, who either in-
vented them or borrowed them from his critics, somehow 
managed to remain undismayed" (p. 217). Others have 
shared this view, that Plato's acknowledgment of "forms" 
in dialogues certainly later than the Parmenides (e.g. 
Sophist and Timaeus) serves as textual evidence that 
Plato was unswayed by the third man argument.12 But to 
counter this, let me present two relevant bits of 
Platonic evidence: 
"Now God, whether because he so willed or 
because some compulsion was laid upon him not 
to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought 
and created one only, the couch which really and 
in itself is. But two or more couches were 
never created by God and never will come into 
being." 
"How so?" he said. 
"Because," said I, "if he should make only 
two, there would again appear one of which they 
both would possess the form or idea, and that 
would be the couch that really is in and of it-
self, and not the other two." (Republic 597c) 1 3 
Are we right, then, in describing the Heaven 
as one, or would it be more correct to speak of 
heavens as many or infinite in number? One it-
must be termed, if it is to be framed after its 
Pattern. For that which embraces all intelligible 
Living Creatures could never be second, with 
another beside it; for if so, there must needs 
exist yet another Living Creature, which should 
embrace them both, and of which they two would 
each be a part; in which case this Universe 
could no longer be rightly described as modelled 
on these two, but rather on that third Creature 
which contains them both. (Timaeus 31a) 1 1 1 
According to Cherniss,1^ Plato's casual use of this 
argument (as in the above examples) demonstrates that 
Plato was unafraid of the third man argument, believing 
it to be irrelevant.16 The third man argument applies, 
says Cherniss, only if idea and particular be treated 
as homogeneous members of a multiplicity. This provides 
no solution, for the question of whether the "resem-
blance" between idea and particular allows us to count 
the ideas with the particulars in s'ome larger context 
(making them, in a sense, part of the same "multiplicity") 
is exactly what is at issue here. No, I think Plato 
mentions the objection to the theory of forms regularly 
as a sort of reminder to the reader that the theory-as-
1'» 
presented is in fact subject to such objections. What 
I am suggesting is perhaps less incredible than it may 
at first sound; I shall attempt to build the case that 
Plato recognized that any articulated version of his 
theory of forms would inevitably be lacking, would 
inevitably fall to the third man, and that Plato none-
theless held a "theory of forms," as Aristotle claims 
he did. 1 8 
III« Plato's theory of forms after the third man argu-
ment . Let me first recant the title of this section, for 
I take it that neither the theory of forms (as represent-
ed in Parmenides) nor the third man argument were 
original with Plato.*9 Several dramatic devices employ-
ed by Plato in the Parmenides contribute to this 
assumption: (A) Socrates is presented as a very young 
man, untutored in the method of dialectic; the theory 
he presents is an elementary one (so elementary, in 
fact, that Socrates denies there to be forms of such 
natural substances as hair and dirt). (B) Parmenides 
asks the young Socrates directly, " . . . did you invent 
this distinction yourself, which separates the abstract 
ideas from the things which partake of them?" (130b) 
Yet the old man does not wait for an answer; instead he 
immediately asks another question. Socrates responds 
only to the second. We see, then, that the first 
question was intended rhetorically. This becomes even 
more evident when (C) Parmenides reintroduces the forms 
(135b-c) in a way which indicates that this is no "new" 
theory to him. 
Historically as well, we have good reason to be-
lieve that some kind of "theory of forms" predates 
Plato. Aristotle suggests such in the Metaphysics 
(987bU-ll): 
Plato accepted his (Socrates1) teaching, but held 
that the problem applied not to sensible things 
but to entities of another kind—for this reason, 
that the common definition could not be a defini-
tion of any sensible thing, as they were always 
changing. Things of this other sort, then, he 
called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were 
all named after these, and in virtue of a rela-
tion to these; for the many existed by participa-
tion in the Ideas that have the same name as 
they. Only the name 'participation* was new. 2 0 
This passage, although it suggests only that the notion 
of forms was at least as old as Socrates, is straight-
forward in its assertion that neither sensible things 
nor forms were new concepts with Plato; only "participa-
tion" was novel. 
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If both the forms and the third man argument do 
predate Plato, what have we shown? At least this: 
that Plato inherited the clear criticisms of the theory 
of forms along with the theory itself. So the first 
kind of formulation of the theory of forms—which we 
might think of as the first moment in the long dialectic 
attached to the theory—is exactly that kind which we 
find in the Parmenides. Importantly, the Parmenides, 
far from being the end of the theory of forms, is—in 
terms of sophistication—the very beginning of the 
articulation of that theory; it provides a most ele-
mentary formulation. 
Lest the reader despair at my claim that Plato 
could write a "middle dialogue," the Parmenides, with 
an unsophisticated "early" theory represented there, 
let us step aside for a moment and look at the whole 
Platonic endeavor. Since I am assuming a "context" for 
the dialogues, I should perhaps share this with the 
reader. Whatever the limitations of the written word, 
and whatever the commitment to the superiority of dia-
lectic, Plato must have believed that written dialogues 
could provide meaningful assistance to those at the 
Academy who were at various levels in their philosophic 
development. Because the more advanced students were 
able to profit from more sophisticated material than 
beginners, Plato composed dialogues of different de-
grees of complexity, much as a set of textbooks might 
be compiled. If we look at Plato's writing in this way, 
we will find ourselves opposed to the long tradition of 
scholars who see Plato as "developing" (and perhaps 
later abandoning) a theory. Instead—and this is how I 
shall argue in what follows--Plato may be understood as 
holding a sophisticated theory of forms which lie articu-
lates to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the 
focus and subject matter of each dialogue. 
I have already indicated that the ontological theory 
of the Parmenides is an elementary one. Now we must 
turn to successively more developed treatments of the 
theory of forms in the dialogues. Through (however 
brief) accounts of the Phaedo, the Republic and the 
Sophist, we will trace accounts of the forms and suggest 
how each is affected by the valid third man argument. 
The Phaedo provides a statement of the theory of 
forms which--as in the Parmenides--is subject to the 
third man. I mention it here because it is so frequent-
ly cited for the theory and because it represents a 
theory at least somewhat more developed than that of 
the Parmenides. The rich words of Socrates insist on 
the intuition that something like the theory of forms is 
correct, but make no claims about truth: "I hold simply 
and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing 
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else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion 
(call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however 
it may have been gained; about the way in which it 
happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do 
insist that beautiful tilings are made beautiful by 
beauty" (100d). 2 1 
By this account, absolute beauty, as the perfect 
instance of itself, is another beautiful entity "along-
side" beautiful things; this necessitates the positing 
of a third "Beauty" in terms of which both the beautiful 
things and absolute beauty are beautiful. But this is, 
of course, precisely what the third man is about. 
A still more sophisticated version of the theory 
of forms—but one yet arguably victim to the third man— 
is the theory we find represented in Book VI of the 
Republic, the account of the divided line. The third 
and fourth levels of the line are relevant here since 
only these admit forms. The third is the locus for an 
elementary type of forms: mathematical and geometric 
truths (the segment is the same length as the second 
[physical objects] because we can exhaustively describe 
any physical object in terms of its mathematical predi-
cates—when "mathematical" is construed broadly to in-
clude physical laws). I take it that the third man 
argument, if applied to this sort of form, would go 
something like this: there is some third thing by 
virtue of which both the triangle and triangularity 
are triangular. Now I admit it seems rather odd to 
put the argument this way; and it is still more odd to 
imagine what sort of similar argument would have to be 
used in the case of arithmetic. There is some third 
thing by virtue of which both "2 + 2 = 4" and "2 apples 
+ 2 oranges = 4 pieces of fruit" are alike. 
Yet the third level is not fundamental for Plato 
(and thus, is of less concern to us) since mathematics 
relies on unproven definitions and axioms. The fourth 
level is posited as the "ground" of the third, each 
level of the line having been shown to be dependent on 
the level above it. Now, the content of the fourth 
level (which we come to understand dialectically) is 
represented as the most fundamental level of the line 
itself, free of any hypotheses, the level of Platonic 
forms. Finally, there is the Good which stands beyond 
the whole scheme and is the cause of it all. 2 2 Clearly, 
the third man argument could be applied to the fourth 
level themselves (in exactly the same way as the 
Phaedo's analysis of beauty was described above) but I 
suggest that Plato here provides his own third man, the 
Good. What I mean is that, insofar as the Good is the 
cause of a beautiful thing's participation in the form 
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of beauty, it is itself "that in virtue of which both 
the beautiful thing and beauty are beautiful." But 
this is of little consolation since, as the argument 
runs, we should now ask for that in virtue of which the 
beautiful thing and beauty and the Good are all alike. 
No, we do not yet have an invulnerable version of the 
theory. (Yet, surely, the reader begins to feel a sort 
of slippage in the fit of the argument to the subject 
matter.) 
What I believe to be the most sophisticated view 
of the theory of forms appears in the Sophist. Being 
is represented as ontologically fundamental; motion, 
rest, sameness, and difference correspond to what—in 
the Republic—were fourth level forms. It is easy to 
see how we might apply the third man argument here (in 
precisely the way it was applied to the trio of the 
Good, beauty, and the beautiful thing). I do not wish 
to deny that the argument could be so used. However, 
what I want to suggest is that at least in the case of 
the Sophist (but, likely, in the case of the Republic 
as well) the third man argument seems inappropriate, 
even irrelevant. 
There is in the Sophist a more complex system of 
forms to be elaborated. Whereas—in all the other 
Platonic accounts of the theory of forms—there is an 
explicit order, a progression through "levels of being" 
where each succeeding level is distinct and more onto-
logically fundamental than its preceding level (and it 
is not entirely misleading to think of these levels as 
expressing various degrees of abstraction), the Sophist 
cannot be so described. Motion is not a more abstract 
version of some particular moving thing, at least not 
in the way that beauty seems a more abstract description 
of some beautiful particular thing. The unique nature 
of the ontology of the Sophist is in the relations 
among the forms (or kinds, y£vr\ ) themselves. All par-
ticular things must participate in some combination of 
motion, rest, sameness, difference, and in being. But, 
although we might advance the argument of the third man, 
it would sound even more curious than we noted in the 
case of the Republic. It would go, "there must be some 
fourth thing by virtue of which being, motion, and the 
loping gazelle are all alike." One wants to complain 
that, although we understand what is meant by the argu-
ment, it seems to miss the point. Being is not itself 
some third discreet thing in terms of which we describe 
both motion and the loping gazelle, nor is motion to be 
included alongside other particular moving entities with 
a claim that might go, "motion itself moves." Or so I 
maintain. 
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But let us say that we do hold the third man argu-
ment to be relevant here, that we are untroubled by 
such inelegant expressions. Still, we are left with 
Plato's own apparent continuation in holding the theory 
of forms. How are we to account for this? A rather 
standard disclaimer may be appropriate here: we are 
mistaken if we expect to locate the kernel of Plato's 
theory of forms in the dialogues themselves. As he 
says in Epistle VII (341c-d): 
There does not exist, nor will there ever 
exist, any treatise of mine dealing there-
with (the subjects which I seriously study). 
For it does not at all admit of verbal 
expression like other studies, but, as a 
result of continued application to the 
subject itself and communion therewith, 
it is brought to birth in the soul on a 
sudden, as light that is kindled by a 
leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes 
itself. 2 3 
Similarly, the Phaedrus criticizes the written word: 
". . .no written discourse, whether in metre or in 
prose, deserves to be treated very seriously."2,1 The 
dialogues are propaedeutic to the most sophisticated 
aspects of Plato's philosophy.25 Another dialectical 
movement must be made to a theory still more funda-
mental . 
Mow if Plato's philosophy cannot be written, then 
certainly I am not about to reveal the "true theory of 
forms": but undoubtedly it is not enough for one to 
claim simply that there is a more fundamental theory 
and leave it at that. Plato provides a glance at the 
means to move beyond the earlier versions of the theory 
i n Republic VII, in his discussion of the education of 
the guardians. As Havelock argues (against Cherniss and 
the whole scholarly history of the Academic curriculum) , 
Plato would not have restricted study to plane and solid 
geometry and the number theory (discreet sciences of the 
day). It has been held that, since the sciences of 
ideal astronomy and ideal harmonics "did not exist," 
Plato could not have taught them. But Havelock points 
out that the business of the Academy must have been the 
creation of such sciences, for Plato explicitly recog-
nizes these in the Republic. Although Speusippus may 
have rejected the theory of forms, although Xenocrates 
may have converted the forms into mathematical numbers, 
it was still the case that the business of philosophy 
in the Academy was the "process of isolation and 
abstraction." The most fundamental description of what 
is cannot be articulated, can only be identified by 
pointing.2*5 The purpose, then, of the instruction was, 
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"to introduce the pupil . . . to problems or proposi-
tions concerning moving bodies and musical harmonies 
out of which he would be constrained, for example, to 
grasp motion as a purely abstract conception, expressing 
a genus which exists in two different species, and to 
contemplate the necessity of composing analytic formulae 
or 'definitions' which translate particular motions in 
terms of general laws." 2 7 Certainly number theory was 
not (is not) the most fundamental truth, yet even this 
was beyond what Plato could offer in his propaedeutic 
dialogues. It was possible to study astronomy (as the 
science of solid bodies in motion) in the Academy, but 
set theory and theoretical mathematics which might pro-
vide a ground for theoretical physics and astronomy, 
were almost certainly still out of reach. 2 8 
The theory of forms, in any articulated version, 
made that which is most abstract less abstract than it 
is (i.e., concrete enough to be written or spoken of). 
So no matter how far away from the early versions of 
the theory of forms (his own or others') Plato moved 
dialectically, the non-demonstrable aspects were still 
out of reach, much as Parmenides points out at 135b-c. 
University of Kansas 
20 
NOTES 
"hlere I wish to oppose only a particularly strong 
form of the position: that Plato—after having written 
a number of dialogues, and after having posited the 
theory of forms—developed (or, perhaps, had brought to 
his attention) the argument which has come to be called 
"the third man"; further, that Plato recognized this 
argument as fatal to the theory of forms and therefore 
rejected that theory. 
2 
II. H. Fowler, translator. 
3 
Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the 
Parmenides," Philosophical Review, LXIII (1954), pp. 
319-49. 
i| 
Vlastos also states that the recognition of the 
hidden premises of the third man argument and their 
"intolerable" logical consequences would have been fatal 
to Plato's Separation Theory and Degrees-of-Reality 
Theory: "He was thus holding consciously a metaphysical 
Theory whose disastrous implications were hidden from 
his conscious mind" (p. 343). 
5Wilfrid Sellars, "Vlastos and the Third Man," 
Philosophical Review, LXIV (1955), pp. 405-37. 
Peter Geach, "The Third Man Again," Philosophical 
Review, LXV (1956), pp. 72-82. 
7 
Colin Strang, "Plato and the Third Man," Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 
No. 37 (1963) , pp. 147-64. 
Henry To loh and David James Louzecky, "Plato's 
Third Man Argument," Phronesis, XVII (1972), pp. 80-94. 
9 
In particular, Teloh and Louzecky reject Vlastos' 
translation of ev £HCLOTOV CZÖOQ as "there is in every 
case a single Form." They suggest instead, "in every 
case the Form is one." 
1 0J. E. Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 
213-24. 
21 
There are literally dozens of articles which 
continue the controversy, but the "sides" of the dispute 
have been adequately represented here, I believe. 
12 " . . 
Heedless to say, this view presupposes that a 
"progression" can be traced from the early to the late 
dialogues--a view at best controversial. 
13 
Paul Shorey, translator. 
i n 
R. G. Burry, transaltor. 
15 
Harold F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 
and the Academy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
194M) , pp. 293-98. 
16 
Cherniss1 implication that Plato would not have 
mentioned arguments which he believed to be destructive 
of his own theories in curious, of course, to anyone 
who takes the dialectical method seriously. 
17 
An interesting similar case is that Parmenides' 
"sail" objection to the theory of forms occurs at 
Euthydemus 300e-301a [Rosamond Kent Sprague, "Parmenides' 
Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox," Phronesis, XII (1967), pp. 
91-98], and at Philebus 15b-c. 
18 
At Metaphysics 987a35, Aristotle speaks of Plato's 
having held "even in later years" (presumably while 
Aristotle studied with Plato at the Academy) that there 
is no knowledge of the "sensible things" which Aristotle 
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I am indebted to Professor Richard Cole for drag-
ging me out of the cave on these points. 
